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1. Introduction
In the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 3) goodwill is defined as future 
economic benefits arising from assets acquired in a business combination that are not indi-
vidually identified and separately recognised. Goodwill can be recognised in the financial 
statements only in cases of business combinations (internally generated goodwill, uncon-
firmed by a market transaction, cannot be recognised). In accordance with the accounting 
rules in IFRS, goodwill is (since 2004) no longer subject to amortisation, but instead, it 
has to be annually tested for impairment. On the day of its initial recognition, the value of 
goodwill is defined on the basis of the acquirer’s payment; any subsequent measurement 
can only be based on accounting estimates. Since its value after initial recognition cannot 
be objectively defined, this accounting approach to goodwill is considered problematic.
As stated by Ramanna and Watts (2011), standard setters argue that the goodwill impair-
ment process allows managers to convey private information. On the other hand, the agency 
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theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) suggests that managers will use 
unverifiability and manage financial reports opportunistically. In accordance with the agency 
theory, problems arise when the goals of the principal are in conflict with those of the agent 
and the two parties have asymmetric information.
There is a high degree of subjectivity, allowing for opportunistic behaviour among man-
agement when testing goodwill for impairment. Since the allocation of goodwill to cash-gen-
erating unit(s) (CGUs) and the calculation of the recoverable amount (when active prices 
are not available) of CGUs is subject to discretion (Carlin & Finch, 2010), studies suggest 
that management performs impairment testing of goodwill opportunistically (Segal, 2003; 
Beatty & Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2011).
This study aims to perform an empirical analysis of incentives that might stimulate man-
agement to act opportunistically while performing the impairment test of goodwill. Such 
research based on IFRS users, particularly in times of financial crisis, is lacking. According 
to the theory, during times of crisis, management would have (due to poor business per-
formance) higher incentives to form income at a desired level.
Most of the existing studies from the field of goodwill impairment testing were made 
on samples of US Financial Accounting Standards 142 (FAS 142) users. However, these 
studies cannot be generalised to IFRS users since findings have shown (Leuz, Nanda & 
Wysocki, 2003; Burgstahler, Hail & Leuz, 2006) that institutional factors have an important 
influence on the accounting reporting quality. Goodwill impairment testing between FAS 
142 and IFRS is still not uniform; thus, it is worth examining the accounting discretion in 
the process of goodwill impairment testing in the case of IFRS users.
This study was performed on the sample of Italian publicly traded non-financial com-
panies who prepare their annual accounts in accordance with IFRS, focusing on the period 
2008–2010. Glaum, Schmidt, Street and Vogel (2013) indicate that the quality of IFRS 
financial statements differs between countries. The level of investor protection was found 
to be the most important factor of financial reporting quality (Leuz et al. 2003; Burgstahler 
et al. 2006). This is why our sample focuses on data from an environment with a low degree 
of investor protection.
The results of the empirical research indicate that in selected Italian companies, incentives 
exist, while recognising the impairment of goodwill. The likelihood of goodwill impairment 
is significantly affected by changes of management and management remuneration systems. 
On the other hand, we found as statistically non-significant those factors that derive from 
accounting standards and which facilitate discretion. The study contributes to the literature 
from the field of accounting choice in the environment of EU companies reporting under 
IFRS in times of financial crisis.
2. Theoretical background
The theoretical review of opportunistic discretionary choice research in the case of goodwill 
impairment provides evidence that the most common statistically significant incentives 
(reasons) for impairment of goodwill are: management tenure (Beatty & Weber, 2006; 
Ramanna & Watts, 2011) or changes of management (Guler, 2006; Masters-Stout, Costigan 
& Lovata, 2008; Zang, 2008), management’s compensation system (Guler, 2006; Beatty & 
Weber, 2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2011), restrictive debt covenants (Beatty & Weber, 2006; 
Ramanna & Watts, 2011) or proportion of debt financing (Zang, 2008; Godfrey & Koh, 
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2009), and unexpectedly high (Segal, 2003; Van de Poel, Maijoor & Vanstelen, 2009) or 
unexpectedly low income (Guler, 2006; Cowan, Dilla & Jeffrey, 2006; Van de Poel et al., 
2009; Maijoor & Vanstraelen, 2006). Incentives for the opportunistic impairment of goodwill 
are supported by the rules in accounting standards that allow opportunism. In the case of 
accounting for goodwill, these can be related to the number of formed CGUs (Lapointe-
Antunes, Cormier & Magnan, 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2011), and the share of unverifiable 
net assets (Ramanna & Watts, 2011).
Existing research has shown a link between incentives and factors that lead to opportun-
istic discretionary choice of goodwill in connection with the introduction of US FAS 142 
(Segal, 2003; Cowan et al., 2006; Guler, 2006; Beatty & Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Ramanna 
& Watts, 2011). In the case of IFRS, the accounting treatment of goodwill in the first year 
of IFRS introduction was different1 which makes these research findings not generalisable. 
In the European environment, this problematic domain, with an emphasis on companies 
reporting under IFRS, has only been dealt by Verriest and Gaeremynck (2009), Van de 
Poel et al. (2009), Lemans (2009), Hamberg, Paananen & Novak (2011), and AbuGhazaleh, 
Roberts & Hares (2011).2
Studies performed on the samples of large European companies reporting under IFRS 
and focusing on times of financial crisis are lacking.
Most studies of opportunistic discretionary choice regarding goodwill impairment ana-
lyse how incentives may lead to opportunism; only a few studies include (in addition to 
incentives) factors that allow discretion – the number of CGUs (using FAS: Beatty & Weber, 
2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2011; the use of IFRS: Verriest 
& Gaeremynck, 2009) and the proportion of unverifiable net assets (Ramanna & Watts, 
2011; Shepardson, 2011). Factors that allow discretion derive from the characteristics of 
accounting standards.
2.1. Contracting motives and opportunistic discretion
Companies with more tight debt covenants are supposed to act more opportunistically, to 
avoid possible violations of covenants and thus incur higher cost of financing. Since, the 
inclusion/exclusion of goodwill in covenants is not often disclosed (Ramanna & Watts, 
2011), authors often tend to use as a proxy the debt ratio (Zang, 2008; Godfrey & Koh, 
2009) or financial leverage ratio (Hamberg et al., 2011). Only Beatty and Weber (2006) and 
Ramanna and Watts (2011) analysed the impact of covenant slack on goodwill impairment.
It is supposed that companies with higher debt ratio will have a lower financial slack 
and be more favourable to record lower impairments (Cotter, Stokes & Wyatt, 1998). In 
the survey performed by Easton, Eddey & Harris (1993), debt ratio proved to be one of the 
most important factors that influence the decision of chief executive officers about impair-
ments of assets. On the basis of 82 Australian publicly traded companies Cotter et al. (1998) 
provided evidence that companies with higher debt ratios recorded lower impairments of 
long-lived assets.
Beatty and Weber (2006) were the first who explored the impact of debt covenants on 
discretion of goodwill impairments (in the case of FAS 142 implementation). Companies 
with less financial slack in net worth covenant threshold were less likely to record goodwill 
impairments. Ramanna and Watts (2011) applied a similar approach, but upgraded the 
research by including the periods after the introduction of FAS 142. The variable in use 
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was measured as the product of debt ratio and an indicator if the firm has a net worth or 
net income based debt covenant. The measure proved to be negatively associated with 
impairment losses of goodwill.
On the other hand, Zang (2008) used the (financial) leverage ratio as a proxy for debt 
covenants. Transitional impairment losses of goodwill proved to be relatively smaller for 
more highly leveraged firms. Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) established that those com-
panies with higher than target (industry) leverage recorded lower transitional goodwill 
impairment losses (sample of Canadian companies).
Moreover, it is argued that management with a longer tenure is associated with lower 
impairments of goodwill (Beatty & Weber, 2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2011). Management 
with a longer tenure has probably made the original acquisition decision and is thus not 
well disposed to the recognition of goodwill impairment since it might suggest that the 
purchase price was too high. On the sample of American companies, both, Beatty and 
Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2011) confirmed the stated hypothesis. More often 
authors provided evidence that chief executive officer changes lead to higher impairments of 
goodwill (Zang, 2008; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Hamberg 
et al., 2011). This was the case of FAS 142 introduction (Zang, 2008) and transition goodwill 
impairment losses in Canadian context (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008). Higher levels of 
impairment may be due to management’s desire for the immediate write-off of goodwill 
or its parts to avoid write-offs, which would likely occur in the future and could largely be 
attributed to their (poor) management performance.
Management’s compensation is also supposed to have an impact on decision about good-
will impairment. If the management is remunerated on the basis of accounting numbers, 
impacted by the impairments of goodwill, it is not willing to recognise write-offs (Hamberg 
et al., 2011). It is argued that the highest proportion of cash compensation is account-
ing-based (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), usually written on net income and thus including 
the effect of impairment losses. Beatty and Weber (2006) established that managers with 
earnings-based bonuses which included transitional impairment losses recorded lower 
goodwill impairment losses when adopting FAS 142. In the case of Ramanna and Watts 
(2011), 57% of the companies which did not record impairment loss had a variable remu-
neration in the form of cash bonus, while in the companies where impairment loss was 
recorded this was the case only in 39% of the companies. The test of association resulted 
as statistically significant.
2.2. Factors that facilitate discretion
Empirical studies of the factors that facilitate goodwill discretion are lacking. Ramanna and 
Watts (2007) were the first to explore the factors that might lead to opportunism of managers 
in this respect. From their point of view discretion can be aligned to (Ramanna & Watts, 
2007, 2): (1) the number and size of CGUs; and (2) the proportion of unverifiable net assets.
Authors are not completely coherent regarding the impact of CGUs’ number on dis-
cretion choices. Ramanna and Watts (2007) demonstrated that more CGUs lead to lower 
impairments of goodwill. Similarly, in their research based on the sample of American 
companies, Zhang and Zhang (2007), established that in the process of acquisition a larger 
proportion of purchase price surplus (over the fair value of net identifiable assets) was 
allocated to goodwill (and less to previously not recognised intangible assets) in the case 
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of companies with more segments (proxy for CGUs). The analysis suggests that companies 
believe that more discretion would be present in cases where more segments are formed. 
On the other hand, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) believe that a higher number of CGUs 
make the redistribution of losses among CGUs more difficult. However, the results of their 
empirical analysis did not confirm their expectations. Companies with more CGUs recorded 
less goodwill impairment. Similarly, Ahmed and Guler (2007) state that more CGUs are 
connected with lower extent of discretion. In their empirical analysis, based on American 
publicly quoted companies, they established that goodwill of companies with more CGUs 
explains a higher extent of stock prices in comparison with goodwill allocated to less CGUs. 
Ceteris paribus, the more numerous CGUs are, the less discretion there is while allocating 
goodwill to CGUs. On the basis of present day studies, the relationship between the number 
of CGUs and subsequent discretion in impairment testing is still not clear.
The relation between (un)verifiable net assets and goodwill impairment was analysed by 
Zhang and Zhang (2007) and Ramanna and Watts (2011). Zhang and Zhang (2007) meas-
ured verifiable net assets as [cash + investments – debt – preferred equity] / [total assets 
- liabilities]. Zhang and Zhang (2007) established that companies allocated less purchase 
price surplus (over the fair value of net identifiable assets) to goodwill in cases when the 
share of unverifiable net assets was smaller. More goodwill was recognised in companies 
with larger proportions of unverifiable net assets. In the case of Ramanna and Watts (2011) 
higher unverifiable net assets were associated with lower impairments of goodwill.
3. Research framework
3.1. Research question and methodology
Since studies have shown that companies act opportunistically while applying the impair-
ment test of goodwill (Segal, 2003; Beatty & Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 
2011), we were interested in establishing if there is any opportunistic discretion while 
applying IAS 36 in the case of large Italian companies reporting under IFRS in the time of 
the current financial crisis.
In order to answer the research question we focused our analysis on Italian publicly 
traded companies reporting under IFRS. Italian companies were selected for the following 
reasons: Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) have shown that institutional factors 
have an important influence on the accounting reporting quality. In accordance with the 
study by Leuz et al. (2003), Italy falls within countries with a low level of investor protec-
tion. This variable is evidenced in the study by Leuz et al. (2003) as an important factor 
that influences the extent of earnings management in one country. Countries with a low 
level of investor protection are supposed to have a higher extent of earnings management.
Studies from the field of goodwill impairment testing are possible only on samples of 
countries where in the past sufficient mergers and acquisitions occurred. Unless a coun-
try has a high merger and acquisition activity and a developed stock exchange, this kind 
of study is not feasible since the sample of companies’ is too small. Small samples were 
already a problem in the research by Beatty and Weber (2006) and Rammana and Watts 
(2011) made on samples of US companies. In the period 1990–2007 Italy was among the 
top five EU countries with the highest number of mergers and acquisitions (Erel, Liao & 
Weisbach, 2009). Among these countries Italy was the country with the lowest degree of 
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investor protection. Thus, from the perspective of earnings management, Italian business 
environment is particularly interesting.
The sample consists of companies with the market indicators of goodwill impairment 
need; i.e. those that have the book value of equity capital (B) higher than the market value 
(M); M/B ratio < 1 on the day of the balance sheet for each financial year (in accordance 
with the methodology of Beatty & Weber, 2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2011). In our sample 
we retained only companies with a difference between the book value and the market value 
of equity higher than the book value of goodwill (methodology of Beatty & Weber, 2006). 
Firstly, to enhance the power of tests, companies with the M/B ratio less than one for two 
consecutive years were selected (in accordance with the methodology of Ramanna & Watts, 
2011), but the sample proved to be too small.
We focused on times of financial crisis, i.e. the period 2008–2010. The unfavourable 
effects of the financial crisis, with different time delays, also affected individual activities in 
the real sector, thus increasing the likelihood of the need for CGU and its related goodwill 
impairments.
We excluded financial institutions and companies with no goodwill on their balance 
sheet. The final sample resulted in 188 observations. The financial data were gathered from 
the database Datastream, Worldscope and hand collected from the annual reports3.
According to the methodology of Ramanna and Watts (2011), firstly, the presence of 
positive private information hypothesis was tested. We examined whether non-impairment 
firms are more likely to show evidence of net share repurchase activity (repurchase of own 
shares) or net insider buying (directors’ purchases of shares). For this purpose we used the 
test of association as explained in Section 4.
For the empirical testing of opportunistic discretion, the logistic regression analysis was 
used. In our case, the distribution of the dependent variable (impairment of goodwill) is 
asymmetric and takes value between 0% and 15% (measured as goodwill impairment for 
the year over previous year’s assets). Only 26% of the companies in the sample recorded 
the impairment of goodwill (48 out of 188 companies). That is why multivariate linear 
regression analysis (used by Segal, 2003; Ramanna & Watts, 2011) or tobit analysis (Cowan 
et al., 2006; Beatty & Weber, 2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) 
is not appropriate (Hopkins, 2011). Logistic regression was already used for the empirical 
testing of opportunistic discretionary choice in accounting for goodwill impairments by 
Guler (2006), Van de Poel et al. (2009), Verriest and Gaeremynck (2009).
Based on the review of existing research findings and the analysis of the rules in account-
ing standards, we formed a model for verifying opportunistic discretionary choice in the 
process of goodwill impairment testing through incentives and factors that may lead man-
agement to these practices. In addition to these variables, the model includes some variables 
that were not previously subject to such analysis. Given that the analysis is based on the data 
from times of financial crisis, the model includes variables that could be especially important 
in times of financial crisis. Independent variables such as impairment of financial assets, 
impairment of tangible assets (PP&E), and impairment of intangible assets were originally 
included in the model, with the aim of analysing their possible impact on recognising the 
opportunistic impairment of goodwill. The model used can be expressed as follows:
 
(1)
Impi = Intercept + 훽0(Incentives for opportunism)
+ 훽1(Reporting discretion) + 훽2(Control variables) + 휀i
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In the above equation Impi equals to 1 if a company recorded impairment of goodwill and 
to 0 if no impairment of goodwill was recorded (nominal variable). Independent variables 
are measured as follows.
Incentives for opportunism:
•  changes of chief executive officers (Δ CEO); it is a nominal variable that equals one if 
there has been a change in chief executive officers in time t and t-1, and 0 otherwise 
(according to the methodology of Segal (2003) and Masters-Stout et al. (2008). The 
impairment loss of goodwill is more likely to occur when there is a change in key 
management.
•  management’s compensation (bonus); it is a nominal variable that equals one if the 
key management received a cash based bonus in the year t, and 0 otherwise. Previous 
empirical analysis has shown that cash compensation is usually based on accounting 
profit (Beatty & Weber 2006; Ramanna & Watts 2011). Managers with an accounting 
based compensation are expected to be unwilling to record an impairment loss.
•  debt ratio (debt%); measured as the amount of debt(t) over total assets(t). In accordance 
with the methodology of Godfrey and Koh (2009), the value of goodwill was excluded 
from total assets. It is expected that firms with higher debt ratio are unfavourable to 
impairment of goodwill.
•  big bath and smoothing variables are calculated according to Riedl (2004). Big bath 
and smoothing variables are based on earnings change between year t-1 to t, scaled 
by year t-1 assets. The big bath variable equals 1, if the negative change in earnings 
between years t and t-1, scaled by assets in year t-1, is less than the median value, and 
0 otherwise. Firms with bigger negative changes are expected to have larger goodwill 
impairments (in our case we expect a higher likelihood of impairments). The smooth-
ing variable is the mirror image of the bath variable. A large increase in earnings shall 
lead to a higher likelihood of goodwill impairment.
•  impairments of other assets; we expect that firms with higher impairments of long-
term assets (impairment of financials – Imp fin, impairment of intangibles – Imp int, 
impairment of property, plant and equipment – Imp PP&E; measured as separate 
independent variables) have an opportunistic incentive not to recognise impairments 
of goodwill. Impairments were measured at time t and scaled by the value of total 
assets from time t-1.
Goodwill reporting discretion:
•  number of CGUs  measured as the number of CGUs in time t,
•  verifiable net assets (VNA); measured as [cash + investments – debt – preferred equity] / 
[total assets - liabilities]. Higher proportion of verifiable net assets is expected to allow 
less discretion and thus lead to higher probability of goodwill impairments.
Control variables:
•  proportion of goodwill (GW%); measured as goodwill (t) over total assets (t),
•  changes of ROA (Δ ROA); measured as changes of return on assets of the current 
financial year over the previous financial year,
•  changes of sales (Δ sales); measured as changes of sales of the current financial year 
over the previous financial year, divided by the value of total assets (t-1),
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•  changes of net income (Δ NI); measured as changes of net income of the current 
financial year over the previous financial year, divided by the value of total assets (t-1),
•  changes of cash flow from operations (Δ CF oper); measured as changes of cash from 
operations of the current financial year over the previous financial year, divided by 
the value of total assets (t-1),
•  total assets; measured as the natural logarithm of total assets of the current financial 
year,
•  market value to book value ratio (MVBV); calculated on the day of annual balance 
sheet,
•  buy and hold return (Buy & hold); company’s stock return from the beginning to the 
end of the financial year.
4. Data analysis and results
Frequencies and relative frequencies for nominal variables are presented in Table 1, while 
descriptive statistics of continuous variables are presented in Table 2. Goodwill impairment 
(over total assets) on average represents 0.31% of total assets. It seems that impairments 
of goodwill in times of financial crisis are unexpectedly low (despite the important role of 
goodwill in relation to total assets). The economic non-importance of goodwill impairments 
could be a consequence of economical non-importance of goodwill in the balance sheet of 
companies included in the sample. However, the data show that this is not the case. Goodwill 
represents on average 13.06% of total assets (Table 2).
Frequencies and relative frequencies of non-impairers and impairers shows that CEO 
changes occurred in 16% of the companies, while cash based bonus was paid in 49% of the 
cases. Interestingly, the share of debt is higher in the case of impairers (91%) in compari-
son with non-impairers (66%), most probably indicating normal (economically justified) 
impairments. On average, impairments of financial assets, intangibles and PP&E are small. 
Interestingly, the relative performance changes of impairers are slightly better (less worse) 
Table 1. Frequencies and relative frequencies of nominal variables.




number of companies per year 140 48 188
2008 53 18 71
2009 41 12 53
2010 46 18 64
number of companies per year (in %) 2008 38 % 38 % 38 %
2009 29 % 25 % 28 %
2010 33 % 37 % 34 %
∆cEo no 92% 58% 84%
Yes 8% 42% 16%
Bonus no 44% 72% 51%
Yes 56% 28% 49%
Big bath no 63% 75% 66%
Yes 36% 25% 34%
smoothing no 61% 48% 57%
Yes 39% 52% 43%
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than those of non-impairers (average value of Δ ROA, % Δ sales, % Δ net income and % Δ 
cash flow from operations).
4.1. Association of goodwill write-offs with positive private information proxies
Firstly, we analysed if there are any positive private information about the future cash 
flows of non-impairers that might explain the absence of impairment (information asym-
metry). We performed the test of association, comparing the existence of positive private 
information between non-impairers and impairers (Table 3). Positive private information 
is measured with the presence of net share repurchase activity and positive net insider buy-
ing. Information asymmetry variable takes the value 1 when positive net share repurchase 
activity or positive net insider buying is present, and 0 otherwise.
The analysis reveals that no statistical difference is present while analysing the existence 
of positive private information between impairers and non-impairers. This was confirmed 
even in the separate analysis of both variables. On the basis of our results we cannot state 
that non-impairers have some private information (at least not on the basis of own share 
repurchase and positive net insider buying) which could explain the absence of goodwill 
impairment.
In continuation, the incentives that could stimulate opportunism and factors that facil-
itate discretion are analysed with logistic regression.
4.2. Results of logistic regression
Firstly, univariate logistic regression was used to investigate the relation between depend-
ent variable and individual independent variables. The results in Table 4 indicate that the 
impairment of goodwill is ~ 8-times as likely in companies with a change in CEO in com-
parison with companies where there was no change in CEO. Goodwill impairment is also 
more likely to occur in companies where management did not receive cash based bonus in 
comparison with companies where cash based bonus was received. Statistically significant 
results were obtained also for the share of debt indicating that firms with higher debt ratio 
are more likely to record goodwill impairment (the results are not in line with previous 
studies). The results for the number of CGUs are also statistically significant. Companies 
with more CGUs have a higher likelihood for goodwill impairment.
In the group of control variables, two of them resulted as statistically significant – the 
proportion of goodwill and the value of total assets. Companies with a higher proportion 
of goodwill and higher value of total assets are more likely to record the impairment of 
goodwill.
Univariate logistic regression shows only the relation between a single independent 
variable and the presence of goodwill impairment, but it does not take into account the 
impact of other independent variables. In reality, the probability of goodwill impairment is 
Table 3. information asymmetry.
source: annual reports, own calculations.
  InfoAsym = 0 InfoAsym = 1 Total % with private info
no impairment 50 90 140 64.3%
impairment 22 26 48 54.2%
total 72 116 188 61.7%
chi-square = 0.213 > p = 0.05
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impacted by several factors. We are aware that from the methodological aspect it would be 
more appropriate to perform the multivariate logistic regression including all variables but 
according to the fact that just 48 companies recorded an impairment of goodwill, we were 
constrained to reduce the number of independent variables (for more details see Peduzzi, 
Concato, Kemper, Holford & Feinstein, 1996). That is why we included in the multivari-
ate model only those independent variables that were significant in the bivariate logistic 
regression analysis (6 variables).4
We analysed the presence of possible outliers. In our case we found eight outliers. They 
were excluded from the subsequent analysis. The problem of multicolinearity was not pres-
ent. The results of the multivariate logistic regression are presented in Table 5.
The Wald test demonstrates that the likelihood of goodwill impairment is significantly 
affected by the following incentives:
Table 4. Results of univariate logistic regression.
note: * the level of significance is lower than 0.1; ** the level of significance is lower than 0.05; *** the level of significance 
is lower than 0.01.
source: Worldscope, Datastream, annual reports, own calculations.
 




Δ cEo 2.125 8.377 3.611 19.434 ***.000
% debt .023 1.023 1.009 1.038 ***.001
imp fin (%) .461 1.585 .716 3.508 .256
imp int (%) .093 1.097 .952 1.264 .201
imp PP&E (%) .011 1.011 .724 1.412 .947
Bonus -1.146 .318 .157 .644 ***.001
Big bath -.541 .582 .278 1.217 .150
smoothing .519 1.680 .868 3.250 .124
cGUs .181 1.198 1.077 1.334 ***.001
% vna -.002 .998 .995 1.001 .112
Control variables:
% GW .048 1.049 1.026 1.072 ***.000
Δ Roa .036 1.037 .960 1.119 .357
% Δ revenues .005 1.005 .990 1.020 .528
% Δ net income .022 1.022 .963 1.085 .478
% Δ cF operations .027 1.027 .966 1.091 .391
total assets (ln) 1.067 2.906 1.804 4.680 ***.000
mtBv -.560 .571 .103 3.167 .521
Buy&hold return -.002 0.998 .990 1.005 .555
Year       795
Year (2009) -.149 .862 .373 1.989 .727
Year (2010) .141 1.152 .537 2.472 .716
Table 5. Results of multivariate logistic regression.
source: Worldscope, Datastream, annual reports, own calculations.




Δ cEo 3.707 .766 23.391 1 .000 40.726 9.067 182.926
% debt –.002 .012 .033 1 .856 .998 .974 1.022
Bonus –1.425 .612 5.422 1 .020 .241 .073 .798
cGU .113 .089 1.632 1 .201 1.120 .941 1.332
% GW .076 .026 8.178 1 .004 1.079 1.024 1.136
total assets (ln) 1.911 .473 16.298 1 .000 6.760 2.637 17.097
constant –14.902 3.089 23.277 1 .000 .000
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•  change of chief executive officers (∆ CEO) – there is a positive relation between ∆ 
CEO and the probability of goodwill impairment. Goodwill impairment is ~ 40-times 
more likely to occur when there is a change in CEO in comparison with the situation 
when there is no change in CEO.
•  cash based bonus – there is a negative relation between cash based bonus and the 
probability of goodwill impairment. Goodwill impairment is ~ 4-times (1/0,241) less 
likely to occur when management receives a cash based bonus in comparison with 
the situation when cash based bonus is not paid.
Moreover, in the group of economic indicators, a positive relation between the proportion 
of goodwill and the likelihood of goodwill impairment is statistically significant. Similarly, 
there is a positive relation between the value of total assets and the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment.
The results are in line with the previous findings of US studies and those studies of 
IFRS users which were focused on the first year of IFRS adoption5. The results confirm the 
findings of Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2011) who established that 
management is not willing to record an impairment loss of goodwill when the cash based 
bonus is paid. Moreover, the results confirm the findings of Guler (2006), Zang (2008), 
Hamberg et al. (2011) who established that the change of chief executive officers affects the 
probability of goodwill impairment and the extent of goodwill impairment (Masters-Stout 
et al., 2008). These results indicate that the goodwill impairment rules, at a minimum, are 
applied differently between new and senior CEOs. New management is more likely to impair 
goodwill. There is no reason to believe that the arrival of new management would lead to 
deteriorated results of CGUs to which goodwill is allocated.
The authors are aware of the study limitations. The findings cannot be generalised to 
either all EU members or to other types of companies (financial, non-public). Since the 
analysis addresses only the period of financial crisis, the results cannot be generalised to 
other economic circumstances, since management in times of expansion may behave sig-
nificantly different. Each variable derives from publicly available data and thus the authors 
were constrained to use proxies in cases where required data were not fully available.
5. Conclusion
Goodwill impairment test has become subject to increasing empirical research interest since 
the US FAS 142 was introduced. In accordance with the fact that many subjectivities are 
present when goodwill is tested for impairment, the presented empirical analysis focuses 
on its value reliability. Studies (Beatty & Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 
2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2011) have shown that management has incentives to act oppor-
tunistically when applying the impairment test of goodwill. However, these studies were 
made on samples of US and Canadian companies.
The results of our study made on the sample of Italian publicly traded non-financial 
companies confirm the findings of Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2011) 
emphasising that the remuneration system affects the likelihood of goodwill impairment 
recognition. The results of the presented study confirm the findings of previous US and 
Canadian research (Guler, 2006; Zang, 2008; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008) which empha-
sises that newly appointed management is more likely to record goodwill impairment. 
Since the performance of impairers is slightly better in comparison with non-impairers, the 
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recognition of goodwill impairment in cases of CEO changes seems not to be a consequence 
of poor performance of past management.
In accordance with the fact that no indication of positive private information was evi-
denced in the case of non-impairers, and in spite of the fact that the sample included 
companies with market to book ratio less than one, and thus market indicated a need for 
impairment of goodwill, the results indicate that at least some opportunism is present.
The results of the presented empirical analysis contribute to science through offering 
knowledge in the area of incentives and factors that influence the choice of opportunistic dis-
cretionary goodwill impairment testing in the environment of large European non-financial 
companies with low investor protection. Accordingly, the study contributes to the literature 
in the field of accounting choice in the environment of large EU companies reporting under 
IFRS in times of financial crisis, an area which has not yet been investigated.
Opportunistic behaviour among management leads to higher agency cost and may 
affect the earnings quality. In this sense, the rules in the accounting standards are not well 
designed. Accordingly, it is worth considering how to limit opportunistic discretion.
Possibilities for further research in the field of goodwill’s carrying amount reliability 
include the analysis of other EU countries to determine whether this evidence could be 
generalised to the EU level. Moreover, future studies shall explore if EU countries with dif-
ferent levels of investor protection are characterised by different results. Since goodwill has 
become an increasingly important asset for many companies also in the European context, 
it is crucial to understand its value reliability.
Notes
1.  In the first year of FAS 142 introduction goodwill impairment losses were treated as below 
the line expenses, while in IFRS write-offs were charged to opening retained earnings.
2.  Lai, Leoni & Stacchezzini (2010) made this kind of analysis on the sample of Italian insurance 
companies including data from 2005 to 2009. Since our sample does not include financial 
companies, results of their empirical analysis are not presented in details.
3.  Data about the own shares repurchase, directors’ purchases of shares, changes of management, 
management remuneration and number of CGUs were hand collected from the annual reports.
4.  We were not able to reduce the number of variables to the required level with the use of 
statistical tools as factor analysis, the exclusion of highly correlated variables and the exclusion 
of variables with missing data.
5.  The impairment losses in the period of adoption were treated differently from subsequent 
periods. In the case of IAS 36 implementation the retroactive method was in use. Adoption 
write-offs were charged to opening retained earnings (no effect on income). Afterwards, 
impairment losses became a part of expenses from continuing operation.
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